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Notes 
Beyond Control and Without Fault or 
Negligence: Why Japan Should Be Excused 
from Meeting Its Kyoto Protocol Obligations 
Regina Durr 
The purpose of this Note is to show how force majeure can excuse Japan from its reduced 
CO2 emissions target due under the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is the first and 
only binding international agreement to reduce CO2 emissions amongst industrialized 
and developing countries. This Note draws upon contract principles and data sources, 
including political news sources and environmental studies, to demonstrate how the 
elements of a force majeure event were met in the wake of the earthquake and tsunami of 
March 2011 that led to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster. Through 
showing how far-reaching simultaneous acts of God can be, this research highlights the 
importance of a holistic approach in shaping the enforcement of an international 
agreement like the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
   J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California Hastings College of the Law; Senior Notes 
Editor, Hastings Law Journal; Law in Japan Certificate, Meiji University; B.A., University of 
Washington. I wish to personally thank the following people for their insights and editorial assistance 
throughout the development of this Note: Professor Setsuo Miyazawa, Professor Brian E. Gray, and 
the Hastings Law Journal Notes Team, Staff Editors, and Executive Board. Many thanks also to Riley 
Moyer whom I have great admiration for and support I am grateful for. Deep gratitude is also owed to 
my parents, Leah and Richard Durr, who have taught me how to stay humble and be resilient, 
challenge me to do better, and work tirelessly to make my dreams possible—I hope I make you proud. 
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Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement that aims to reduce 
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions and the presence of greenhouse gases.
1 
Countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol are required to reach their 
respective reduced CO2 emissions target.
2 To meet their reduced CO2 
emissions target, countries have had to restructure their energy portfolios 
to include low CO2 emissions energy sources. For example, Japan has 
restructured its domestic energy portfolio to include nuclear power to 
effectuate its CO2 emissions target of seven percent below its 1990 level 
of CO2 emissions.
3 Feeling confident that Japan would meet its target, in 
2010 Japan imposed upon itself a twenty-five percent reduction target for 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A. 
 2. See infra Part I.A. 
 3. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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2020 and an eighty percent target for 2050 in Copenhagen.4 Japan’s 
commitment to the Kyoto Protocol has been a great source of pride for 
the nation domestically and internationally. 
While nuclear power has been an attractive political tool to 
demonstrate Japan’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, the energy source 
has been disparaged amongst the public of Japan.5 Specifically, support of 
nuclear power in Japan has decreased since the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant (“Fukushima NPP”) disaster on March 11, 2011.6 
The occurrence of the Fukushima NPP disaster brought to light safety 
concerns prompting the public to implore the government to cease 
construction of new nuclear power plants and to decommission existing 
nuclear power plants.7 Japan was forced to reassess the role of nuclear 
power in its efforts to meet its Kyoto Protocol targets, leading it to reduce 
its nuclear energy supply and diversify its energy portfolio.8 In fact, Japan’s 
energy portfolio now focuses on fossil fuel and nonrenewable energy even 
though those energy sources thwart CO2 emissions reduction plans.
9 
The Fukushima NPP disaster also forced Japanese political parties 
to reassess their positions on nuclear power in Japan. The Fukushima 
NPP disaster demonstrated the dangers of nuclear power, and influenced 
then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s radical shift from being a nuclear power 
proponent to being antinuclear.10 In fact, shortly after the disaster, Prime 
Minister Kan declared Japan would phase out nuclear power all together.11 
Eventually, Prime Minister Kan would resign due to poor approval rate 
and handling of the Fukushima NPP disaster.12  
Prime Minister Kan’s immediate successor, Prime Minister Yoshihiko 
Noda, was elected in 2011 on the platform that Japan would instead 
reduce, not eliminate, use of nuclear power.13 Under Prime Minister 
Noda, Japan would not build new nuclear power plants nor extend the 
 
 4. Sven Rudolph, Carbon Markets in Japan: Recent Experiences from CO2 Cap-and-Trade at the 
National and Local Level, 6 Carbon & Climate L. Rev. 354, 354 (2012); Ministry of the Env’t, Gov’t 
of Japan, Overview of the Bill of the Basic Act on Global Warming Countermeasures 1 (Oct. 8, 
2010), http://www.env.go.jp/press/files/en/387.pdf. 
 5. See Lincoln L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law, 2011 
BYU L. Rev. 1937, 1956–57. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1957–58. 
 9. Japan: International Energy Data and Analysis, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/ 
beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=JPN (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 10. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Premier Wants Shift Away from Nuclear Power, N.Y. Times, June 14, 
2011, at A6. 
 11. Davies, supra note 5, at 1957; see also Peter Drysdale, Japan’s Energy Options After 
Fukushima, E. Asia Forum (Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/05/japans-energy-
options-after-fukushima/. 
 12. Drysdale, supra note 11. 
 13. Davies, supra note 5, at 1958; Drysdale, supra note 11. 
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life spans of outdated ones.14 One year later, Noda was defeated by 
former Prime Minister Shinto Abe who pledged to move Japan away 
from nuclear power entirely. While elected on an antinuclear platform, 
Prime Minister Abe took “a closer look at nuclear power” and “within a 
week in office” began a plan to build nuclear power reactors.15 This 
radical shift on use of nuclear power has driven down Prime Minister 
Abe’s approval ratings as Japan’s ongoing use of nuclear power continues 
to spark public outcry.16 The Fukushima NPP disaster thus has made 
nuclear power a decisive issue for prime minister elections. 
While prime ministers have been elected on a pro or antinuclear 
power platform, the legislative branch of the Japanese government (“the 
Diet”) remains uncommitted to any nuclear policy. The Diet established 
a committee “to investigate the direct and indirect causes” of the 
Fukushima NPP disaster in order to propose new policy, reduce and 
prevent future nuclear disasters, and reduce damage on the plant itself.17 
This committee, however, was mandated not to “study matters related to 
the future energy policies of Japan, including the promotion or abolition of 
nuclear power,” or to even “study government administrative policies and 
regulations.”18 As a result of these affirmative acts to limit its understanding 
of nuclear energy policy, the Diet is ignorant of any and all nuclear policy 
options.19 Accordingly, revisions and amendments of laws and 
regulations are undertaken on a “patchwork” basis.20 The Diet’s reactive 
actions combined with its inability to agree on one nuclear power policy 
has led the Diet to remain uncommitted to any nuclear policy. Elected 
officials are too weary of any political fallout that might come upon them 
if they take a strong stance on nuclear power. Thus, an environmental 
and political analysis that studies the role of the Fukushima NPP in 
pursuing a non- or low-carbon Japan is needed.21 
Until now, different studies have come to contrasting conclusions 
about whether Japan will be able to fulfill its Kyoto Protocol obligations 
in the aftermath of the Fukushima NPP disaster. The studies do not, 
however, analyze Japan’s legal right to be excused, domestically and 
 
 14. Drysdale, supra note 11. 
 15. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan’s New Leader Endorses Nuclear Plants, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2012, at A8. 
 16. Alexander Martin, Japan Restarts Nuclear Power After Two-Year Shutdown, Wall St. J. 
(Aug. 11, 2015, 12:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-restarts-first-reactor-since-fukushima-disaster- 
1439259270. 
 17. See Nat’l Diet of Japan, The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Independent Investigation Commission (2012), http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NAIIC_report_lo_res10.pdf. 
 18. Id. at 11. 
 19. Id. at 46. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Davies, supra note 5, at 1963; André Semmler, Renewable Energy in Japan: New Competition 
in the Energy Market After Fukushima 5 (Columbia Univ., Sch. of Int’l Pub. Affairs, Apr. 17, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2124157. 
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internationally, from the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol due to the 
Fukushima NPP disaster. This Note argues that Japan’s reduced CO2 
emissions targets established by the Kyoto Protocol have been frustrated 
by the unanticipated events of the Fukushima NPP disaster. While 
similar nuclear disasters have occurred overseas in 1979 and 1986, no 
country has ever experienced an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power 
plant disaster collectively on one single day.22 Therefore, Japan should 
use the Fukushima NPP disaster as a legal justification for failing to meet 
its reduced CO2 emissions targets obliged under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Japan has a legal right to formally withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol 
domestically and internationally under a force majeure argument. 
However, Japan has not exercised this right in fear that withdrawing will 
yield more serious international and domestic political consequences 
than an outright breach. Nevertheless, this Note argues that Japan should 
make a force majeure argument in order to justify not meeting its Kyoto 
Protocol targets and avoid international penalties in exiting from the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
This Note will answer the following outstanding issues: (1) Whether 
Japan’s carbon emissions have increased naturally or as a result of the 
Fukushima NPP disaster; (2) What will be the domestic and international 
implications of Japan carrying out the reduced nuclear power policy 
following the Fukushima NPP disaster; (3) Whether Japan’s noncompliance 
with the Kyoto standards is excusable and, if so, what the consequences 
of this are; and (4) How Japan’s emissions limitations should be adjusted 
to account for the aftermath of the Fukushima NPP disaster. Part I of 
this Note will explain the Kyoto Protocol, the international agreement at 
issue, and the events of the Fukushima NPP disaster. Part II will provide 
an analysis of how the Fukushima NPP disaster affected Japan’s energy 
portfolio, energy policies, and compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Part 
III will discuss why Japan will not comply with the Kyoto Protocol and 
why Japan should be excused from its obligations under the international 
agreement. It will also demonstrate how Japan can successfully be 
excused from those obligations under force majeure.  
 
 22. On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island disaster near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania occurred 
when the nuclear fuel rods inside the reactor experienced a partial meltdown—meaning some of them 
overheated and melted. There, the radioactive material never escaped the containment vessel. On 
April 26, 1986, the Chernobyl disaster near Kiev, Ukraine occurred because the core had not been 
shut down prior to a test. The power surge triggered events that sent the nuclear reaction out of 
control, causing two explosions. The reactor was not surrounded by a containment structure, so the 
explosions and the subsequent fire sent a giant plume of radioactive material into the atmosphere that 
was dispersed by the winds. See Toshio Serita & Peng Xu, The Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Damage 
Compensation Resolution and Energy Stock Returns (Dec. 7, 2012) (manuscript at 1), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2136060. 
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I.  Background: The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on December 11, 
1997 and entered into force on February 16, 2005, is the first and only 
binding international agreement to reduce CO2 emissions amongst 
industrialized and developing countries.23 Over 150 countries sent 
representatives to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change’s (“UNFCCC”) meeting in Kyoto, Japan, to create a binding 
agreement to address international climate change.24 At the meeting, 
thirty-seven industrialized nations agreed to cut their CO2 emissions by 
at least “5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 and 
2012.”25 For example, Canada agreed to cut its CO2 emissions level six 
percent below its respective 1990s CO2 emission levels.
26 Countries in the 
European Union took a stronger stance and agreed to cut their emissions 
eight percent below their respective 1990 CO2 emissions levels.
27 
Relevant to this Note, Japan agreed to cut its emissions six percent below 
its 1990 CO2 emissions level.
28 While the Kyoto Protocol bound those 
thirty-seven industrialized nations, forty-seven other industrialized and 
developing countries signed with the intent to later opt into the 
agreement to demonstrate commitment to the global environment.29 This 
comprehensive agreement is the Kyoto Protocol, and currently 192 parties 
(191 countries and one regional economic integration organization) have 
become signatories and are thus bound to reduced CO2 emissions targets.
30 
Now, commitments due under the Kyoto Protocol are expiring.31 
 
 23. See Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); Fiona Harvey, World 
Headed for Irreversible Climate Change in Five Years, IEA Warns, Guardian (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change.. 
 24. Nicola Armaroli & Vicenzo Balzani, Energy for a Sustainable World: From the Oil 
Age to a Sun-Powered Future 111 (2011). 
 25. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, Dec. 
11, 1997 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
 26. Id. annex B. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. It is also important to recognize that Japan continued its commitment to CO2 emission 
reduction in 2010 by adding a twenty-five percent reduction target for 2020 and an eighty percent 
target for 2050 in Copenhagen. Rudolph, supra note 4; Ministry of the Env’t, Gov’t of Japan, supra 
note 4. 
 29. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2016). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 3. 
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A. Expiration and Extension Periods 
The Kyoto Protocol consists of two commitment periods: 2008 to 
2012 and 2013 to 2020. In 1997, signatories to the Kyoto Protocol agreed 
that their commitments and obligations would start in 2008 and end in 
2012.32 This is known as the first commitment period. Later on December 
8, 2012 in Doha, Qatar, the “Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol” 
was adopted by a majority of Kyoto Protocol signatories to establish a 
second commitment period.33 The second commitment period began in 
2013 and will end in 2020.34 In effect, the second commitment period 
extends the life of the Kyoto Protocol and makes major amendments to 
the original obligations. 
The second commitment period has more aggressive CO2 emissions 
reduction targets than the first commitment period. While the first 
commitment period aimed to reduce CO2 emissions by an average of five 
percent, the second commitment period aims to reduce CO2 emissions 
levels by at least eighteen percent below 1990 levels. As a result, the 
composition of obliged countries in the second commitment period is 
different from the first. In fact, forty-four countries, some of which did 
not ratify the initial Kyoto Protocol, have only ratified the second 
phase.35 Moreover, despite not ratifying the second phase, countries such 
as the United States and India have adopted a domestic version of the 
Kyoto Protocol to curb global CO2 emissions.
36 In the alternative, some 
countries that did ratify the initial Kyoto Protocol have not ratified the 
second phase.37 For example, Japan, New Zealand, and the Russian 
Federation have not ratified the second commitment period.38 Despite 
the differing composition of the two commitment periods, the original 
Kyoto Protocol obligations persist under the Doha Amendment. 
Thereby, the Kyoto Protocol remains pertinent for discussion. 
 
 32. Harvey, supra note 23. 
 33. See Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Treaty Collection, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&lang=en 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 34. Id.; see also Status of the Doha Amendment, United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php (last visited Feb. 
8, 2016). 
 35. Compare Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, annex B, with Status of the Doha Amendment, supra 
note 34. 
 36. Emily Atkin, Reports: Japan Will Promise to Reduce Carbon Emissions 20 Percent by 2030, 
Climate Progress (Apr. 9, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/04/09/3644893/japan
-climate-change-pledge-maybe/. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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B. Compliance Mechanisms 
To effectuate the Kyoto Protocol, attendees of the meeting created 
a carbon credit scheme. Carbon trading is a market-based tool to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions and is set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol.39 Carbon trading “allows countries that have emissions units to 
spare—emissions permitted them but not ‘used’—to sell this excess 
capacity to countries that are over their targets.”40 These credits are an 
important component of each country’s strategy to reduce CO2 emissions 
because they count toward the country’s CO2 emissions target. The 
Kyoto Protocol’s carbon credit scheme has three mechanisms that help 
the thirty-seven bound countries achieve their respective reduced CO2 
emissions targets: emissions trading, joint implementation, and the clean 
development mechanism.41 
First, obliged countries “may participate in emissions trading for the 
purposes of fulfilling their commitments” under the Kyoto Protocol.42 
Emissions’ trading allows developed countries to trade emissions units 
amongst themselves.43 Emissions’ trading is beneficial for countries who 
have rapidly and successfully reduced their domestic CO2 emissions 
through various acts and therefore have unused emissions units.44 These 
countries with a surplus of carbon credits may then sell their excess 
credits to another obliged country that has exceeded its CO2 emissions 
target.45 
Second, the joint implementation mechanism allows one obliged 
country to invest in CO2 emissions reduction projects in another obliged 
country.46 When an obliged country carries out or finances a climate 
protection project in another obliged country, the investing obliged 
country can credit the resulting emissions reductions to offset its initial 
allocation of carbon credits.47 The recipient country will “gain foreign 
 
 39. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 17. 
 40. International Emissions Trading, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2016). 
 41. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 12, 17; see also Sven Rudolph & Friedrich Schneider, Did 
the Japanese Patient Follow the Doctor’s Orders? Mostly No! A Public Choice Analysis of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Trading Schemes in Japan Before and After the Earthquake 4 (CESifo Working Paper 
No. 3639, Nov. 2011). 
 42. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 17. 
 43. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties Serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 17–20 (Mar. 30, 
2006). 
 44. Emissions Trading, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/2880.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Joint Implementation, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/2882.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 47. See id. 
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investment and advanced technology” and cannot use this mechanism to 
achieve more carbon credits than it was initially allocated.48 The Joint 
implementation mechanism is beneficial to countries that seek to 
produce energy cheaper elsewhere and “realize greater cuts in emissions 
by doing so.”49 
Third, the clean development mechanism (“CDM”) works in a 
similar way to joint implementation; the main difference, however, is that 
CDM projects are jointly carried out by a developed country with a 
reduction commitment and a developing country without a reduction 
commitment.50 With CDM, a developed country carries out an emissions-
saving climate protection project in a developing country, and these 
saved unitscertified emissions reductionscan be credited to the 
developed country’s account.51 The goal of the CDM is not only, as with 
the first two mechanisms, to make emissions reductions more “cost-
effective and offer[] a greater degree of flexibility to industrialized 
countries trying to meet their targets[;]”52 it also serves to assist 
developing countries, through technology transfer, in establishing a 
climate-friendly economy.53 While the Kyoto Protocol permits all three 
mechanisms, the use of these mechanisms must be “additional” to 
domestic reduction measures.54 In sum, no country may comply with its 
CO2 emissions reduction commitments exclusively through the use of 
these three mechanisms. 
C. Noncompliance Grounds 
An obliged country might intentionally or unintentionally not 
comply with the Kyoto Protocol. Intentional noncompliance is caused by 
deliberate acts to escape that country’s obligations whereas unintentional 
noncompliance is caused often by incapacity.55 Important for this Note, at 
least two types of incapacity may be distinguished: financial incapacity 
and administrative incapacity.56 Financial incapacity occurs when a 
country has inadequate economic resources to ensure compliance.57 On the 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. The Clean Development Mechanism, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/2881.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 6. 
 55. Abram Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective, in Engaging 
Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords 39–41, 52–54 
(Edith B. Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998). 
 56. David Vogel & Timothy Kessler, How Compliance Happens and Doesn’t Happen 
Domestically, in Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International 
Environmental Accords, supra note 55, at 20–23. 
 57. Id. 
J - Durr_15 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:43 PM 
508 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:499 
other hand, administrative incapacity refers to inadequate bureaucratic 
resources to issue rules and regulations and to monitor enforcement.58 
These forms of incapacity relate to whether the noncompliance was 
“treaty-induced.”59 
However, an obliged country might also fail to meet its Kyoto 
Protocol obligations by inadvertence. 60 Noncompliance by inadvertence 
refers to when no behavior of the country contributes to the existence of a 
spontaneous happening, such as an earthquake and tsunami, which 
prevents fulfillment of contractual obligations. Inadvertence is also called 
an event of force majeure:  
[A] “Force Majeure Event” means any event beyond the reasonable 
control of the person affected including, without limitation, labour 
dispute, act of God, war, act or circumstance of terrorism, riot, civil 
commotion, malicious damage, accident, breakdown of essential 
computer software, hardware or system failure, fire, flood and/or storm 
and other unforeseen circumstances materially and adversely affecting 
the performance [of the country].61  
When a force majeure event causes noncompliance, “for so long as the 
circumstances continue, [the country] shall be relieved of its obligations 
under the Terms and Conditions which it has been prevented from 
fulfilling as a result of that Force Majeure Event without liability.”62 Of 
course, the obliged country must still “take all reasonable and practical 
steps to minimize any loss and/or disruption resulting from any such Force 
Majeure Event.”63 The impact of an “act of God” depends on the size 
and composition of the obliged country, and can lead to noncompliance 
entirely.64 
D. Consequences of Noncompliance 
Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol handles noncompliance of obliged 
countries by requiring failing countries to “approve appropriate and 
effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and address cases of 
noncompliance.”65 To effectuate the “procedures and mechanisms” of 
failing countries, the Kyoto Protocol establishes a compliance mechanism 
comprised of two branches: the facilitative branch and enforcement 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Chayes et al., supra note 55, at 40. 
 60. Id. 
 61. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on Its Tenth Session, held in Lima from 1 to 
14 December 2014, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2014/9/Add.1 6 (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter UNFCCC 
Lima Report]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 18. 
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branch.66 The facilitative branch provides “advice and assistance” to 
obliged countries to promote compliance and prevent noncompliance, 
whereas the enforcement branch is empowered with the “responsibility 
to determine consequences for Parties not meeting their commitments.”67 
Thus, the enforcement branch only has discretionary authority to make a 
finding of noncompliance, and has further discretion to impose hard 
consequences like financial penalties and trade sanctions once 
noncompliance has been found. Nonetheless, even these discretionary 
powers may be discredited when a failing country exercises its right to 
request “to have its eligibility restored if it believes it has rectified the 
problem and is again meeting the relevant criteria.”68 Accordingly, 
questions arise as to whether the decisions of the enforcement branch are 
legally binding. 
The enforcement branch is afforded three means to enforce 
compliance upon failing obliged countries. First, the noncompliant country 
must present a plan demonstrating how it intends to restore compliance 
with the Kyoto Protocol.69 This plan may account for additional costs of 
buying carbon credits. For example, if an obliged country expects its CO2 
emissions would be thirty percent above its reduction target, the country 
would be forced to buy carbon credits to make its targets.70 Such an act 
“would cost the country nearly $14 billion” to remain part of the Kyoto 
Protocol.71 Second, in the next commitment period, it must cover its 
deficit, plus another thirty percent of that deficit, in addition to whatever 
its commitment would be for that period.72 Finally, the country loses its 
eligibility to sell carbon credits under the carbon trading mechanism of 
the Kyoto Protocol.73 If a country fails these three paths toward 
compliance, then the failing country will be suspended from participating 
 
 66. An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/3024.php (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2016). The Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system is laid out by the Marrakesh Accords, 
which establish both the facilitative branch and enforcement branch. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Matthew Carr, Japan May Declare Force Majeure on Kyoto Protocol, Orbeo Says, 
Bloomberg Bus. (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03-
14/japan-may-declare-force-majeure-on-kyoto-protocol-orbeo-says; see also Bryan Walsh, Bienvenue 
au Canada: Welcome to Your Friendly Neighborhood Petro-State, Time Mag. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://science. 
time.com/2011/12/14/bienvenue-au-canada-welcome-to-your-friendly-neighborhood-petrostate/. 
 71. Walsh, supra note 70. 
 72. Legal Response Initiative, Kyoto Compliance Mechanism ¶ 5 (July 19, 2010), 
http://legalresponseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BP12E-Briefing-Paper-Kyoto-
Compliance- 
Mechanism-19-July-2010.pdf. 
 73. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002). 
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in further Kyoto Protocol discussions.74 Notably, that failed country may 
only incur binding consequences when an “amendment” saying so has 
been adopted into the Kyoto Protocol.75 Because an amendment requires 
three-fourths ratification of participating countries, the Kyoto Protocol 
has not, and arguably does not, lend itself well to the establishment of 
hard sanctions for noncompliance.76 
E. Withdrawal Methods 
When an obliged country wishes to withdraw in anticipation of 
noncompliance the Kyoto Protocol provides two methods of withdrawal: 
explicit “written notification” or implied force majeure.77 Article 27 of 
the Kyoto Protocol handles withdrawal of obliged countries by requiring 
the country to “giv[e] written notification” and placing conditions upon 
complete withdrawal.78 For example, the “written notification” may only 
be given after three years of compliance efforts.79 Because the Kyoto 
Protocol was entered into force on February 16, 2005, then by definition 
the earliest withdrawal notification may have been given on February 16, 
2008.80 Also, “written notification” does not serve as immediate 
withdrawal. Instead, “withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one 
year from the date of receipt . . . of the notification of withdrawal, or on 
such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.”81 
Therefore, assuming an obliged country provided written notification on 
the first available day and that was received by the UNFCCC on the 
same day, a country could withdraw no earlier than February 16, 2009. 
Despite this early date, Canada became the first country to “exercise its 
legal right to formally withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol” by giving 
written notification to the UNFCCC on December 15, 2011.82 Canada 
withdrew because it anticipated it “would have had to purchase a 
significant and costly amount of international credits using funds that 
could be invested” domestically during an economic crisis.83 True to its 
word, in 2012, Canada abandoned all efforts to meet its reduced CO2 
emissions target and has successfully withdrawn from the Kyoto 
 
 74. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 6, 12, 17. 
 75. See An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, supra note 66. 
 76. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 20. 
 77. See id. art. 27. 
 78. Id. (“At any time after three years from the date on which this Protocol has entered into force 
for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 23. 
 81. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 27. 
 82. Env’t Can., A Climate Change Plan for the Purposes of the Kyoto Protocol 
Implementation Act 5 (May 2012).  
 83. Id. 
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Protocol.84 It is expected countries might likewise exercise their legal 
right to withdraw under this method to escape obligations in the second 
commitment period despite those countries having had twelve years to 
comply with their Kyoto Protocol obligations.85 
In the alternative, a country may withdraw when noncompliance is a 
result of a force majeure event.86 As stated earlier, “any event beyond the 
reasonable control” of the country, including a simultaneous earthquake 
and tsunami, may excuse the country from its Kyoto Protocol obligations 
“so long as such circumstances continue” and prevent the country from 
fulfilling its obligations.87 Therefore, should a country experience a force 
majeure event and expect to not reach its CO2 emissions targets, a 
country may successfully declare force majeure to withdraw and prevent 
having to implement new compliance mechanisms, including buying 
additional emissions permits. While no country has exercised this implied 
withdrawal method yet, other countries have used contractual loopholes 
to escape obligations under other international agreements. For example, 
the International Whaling Convention (“IWC”) in 1986 banned the practice 
of commercial whaling.88 Despite having initially signed the IWC 
agreement, Norway and Iceland exercised the IWC’s escape clause to 
resume commercial whaling operations.89 Similarly, this Note argues that 
Japan’s reduced CO2 emissions targets established by the Kyoto Protocol 
have been frustrated by the unanticipated events of the Fukushima NPP 
disaster. 
F. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Disaster 
On March 11, 2011 at 14:46 JST, Japan’s most powerful recorded 
earthquake hit with a magnitude of 9.03.90 The Great East Japan 
Earthquake produced a powerful tsunami that reached heights of up to 
131 feet and traveled up to 6.2 miles inland.91 The tsunami inundated 
about 216 square miles, and caused 15,893 deaths, 6152 injuries, and 2572 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. The date represents twelve years of compliance efforts under the logic that a country signed 
the Kyoto Protocol at the conference on December 11, 1997 and immediately began efforts to comply 
with its Kyoto Protocol obligations to prepare for the enforcement period beginning February 16, 2005. 
 86. UNFCCC Lima Report, supra note 61, at 6. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Which Countries Are Still Whaling?, Int’l Fund for Animal Welfare, http://www.ifaw.org/ 
united-states/our-work/whales/which-countries-are-still-whaling (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 1; Hrabrin Bachev & Fusao Ito, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster—
Implications for Japanese Agriculture and Food Chains (Sept. 3, 2013) (manuscript at 1), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2319767; Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, Mission 
Report: International Fact Finding Expert Mission of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Accident 
Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 19 (June 2, 2011). 
 91. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 1; Bachev & Ito, supra note 90, at 1; Int’l Atomic Energy 
Agency, supra note 90, at 19. 
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missing people.92 The combined earthquake and tsunami also destroyed 
properties along the northeast coast of Japan. One report stated that the 
natural disasters caused 121,782 buildings to totally collapse, an 
additional 278,049 buildings to “half collapse,” and a further 726,110 
buildings to be partially damaged.93 Important for this Note, one of those 
damaged buildings was the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
(“Fukushima NPP”).94 In the course of that damage, the Fukushima 
NPP’s cooling system began to fail, causing large explosions, Level 7 
meltdowns95 and, subsequently, a huge release of radioactivity into the 
environment.96 The incidents surrounding the Fukushima NPP disaster 
classified it as one of the world’s largest nuclear disasters to date and 
served as a catalyst to force Japan to reevaluate its energy portfolio, both 
domestically and internationally.97 
II.  Analysis: Japan Post-Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Disaster 
The Fukushima NPP disaster led to a strong shift in Japan’s energy 
portfolio, driven by safety concerns and public outcry solidly disfavoring 
use of nuclear power.98 Before the Fukushima NPP disaster, two-thirds of 
the Japanese public regularly supported increasing the number of 
nuclear power plants.99 Now, the same percentage of residents opposes 
the use of nuclear power in Japan.100 Another poll showed seventy-four 
percent of Japanese citizens supported the phase out of nuclear power 
post-Fukushima, while another sixty percent expressed little or no 
 
 92. Robert Dinwiddie, Ocean: The Definitive Visual Guide 463 (2014); Nat’l Police Agency 
of Japan, Emergency Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, Damage Situation and Police 
Countermeasures Associated with 2011 Tohoku District off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake 
(Dec. 10, 2015). 
 93. Nat’l Police Agency of Japan, supra note 92. 
 94. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 1; Bachev & Ito, supra note 90, at 1; Int’l Atomic Energy 
Agency, supra note 90, at 19. 
 95. A Level 7 meltdown is the highest level a nuclear event can reach according to the 
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, and is defined as “[a] major release of radioactive 
material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and 
extended countermeasures.” Talea Miller, Rating Nuclear Accidents and Incidents: Which Were the 
Worst?, PBS Newshour (Mar. 18, 2011, 11:40 AM), www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/worst-nuclear-
accidents-in-history/; see also The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, Int’l Atomic 
Energy Agency, www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/ines.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 96. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 1; Bachev & Ito, supra note 90, at 1. 
 97. See Bachev & Ito, supra note 90, at 1. 
 98. Kerin Cantwell et al., Japan’s New Energy Market, in Global Project Finance––Energy, 
Project Perspectives 2122 (Summer 2012), https://www.akingump.com/images/content/4/4/v4/4462/ 
Project-Perspectives-Newsletter-Summer2012.pdf. 
 99. See Young-Doo Wang et al., Ctr. for Energy & Envtl. Policy, International Energy 
Policy in the Aftermath of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: An Analysis of Energy Policies of 
the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, Japan, China and Korea (2013). 
 100. Id. 
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confidence in the safety of the technology.101 Such public aversion was 
illustrated immediately after the Fukushima NPP disaster when tens of 
thousands of demonstrators gathered in Tokyo, and thousands more 
assembled elsewhere across Japan, to demand a permanent shutdown of 
the nation’s nuclear plants.102 Shortly thereafter, public outcry continued 
to build and weekly demonstrations took place throughout the nation.103 
For example, two months after the Fukushima NPP disaster, nearly 5500 
people attended an antinuclear energy rally in Tokyo to celebrate 
together as the last of the nation’s fifty nuclear reactors was switched 
off.104 The momentum continued two months later when an antinuclear 
demonstration amassed over 170,000 people, making it the largest 
demonstration in national history.105 The Fukushima NPP disaster 
refocused Japan’s energy portfolio and policies, placing an importance on 
immediate economic security over long-term safety and environmental 
concerns.106 
A. Energy Portfolio and Policies 
1. Domestic Power Production 
Prior to the Fukushima NPP disaster, Japan had planned to boost 
nuclear power production to more than fifty percent of its electricity by 
2030 from around thirty percent, partly to fight climate change.107 The 
need for power is high because Japan is the third largest overall energy 
consumer globally, behind China and the United States.108 Nevertheless, 
after the Fukushima NPP disaster, Japan has had to reduce the volume 
of power consumed nationally as it drastically shifts its energy portfolio 
in response to pressure from the public to focus on renewable energy.109 
Following the Fukushima NPP disaster, Japan progressively shut 
down all of its nuclear power plants despite most of its fifty-plus nuclear 
 
 101. Davies, supra note 5, at 1956. 
 102. Olga Belogolova, Why Japan Can’t Quit Nuclear Power, Yahoo News: Nat’l J. (Feb. 15, 
2013, 9:30 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/why-japan-cant-quit-nuclear-power-143033191--politics.html. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Thousands March as Japan Switches Off Nuclear Power, Asahi Shimbun: Asia & Japan 
Watch (Mar. 6, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201205060016. 
 105. Belogolova, supra note 102. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Agency for Nat. Res. & Energy, Ministry of Econ., Trade & Indus. of Japan, The 
Strategic Energy Plan of Japan (2014), http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/ 
pdf/4th_strategic_energy_plan.pdf. 
 108. Semmler, supra note 21, at 3; see also Hiroko Tabuchi, Quake in Japan Causes Costly Shift to 
Fossil Fuels, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 2011, at B2 (“Japan, the world’s third-largest user of electricity 
behind China and the United States . . . .”). 
 109. Tabuchi, supra note 108. 
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power plants being operable.110 As a result, Japan has had to rely on 
“coal, oil, and liquefied natural gas for nearly 90% of its power needs.”111 
In the wake of the Fukushima NPP disaster, while nuclear energy 
dropped 100%, gas and oil production increased 10% and 53% 
respectively.112 Finally, on April 11, 2014, the Japanese government agreed 
on a single strategic energy plan.113 
The 2014 Strategic Energy Plan includes four basic principles, 
including safety and energy security.114 The first confirms the “3E + S” 
thrust of Japanese energy policy, which emphasizes “Energy Security” 
while striving for greater “Economic Efficiency” and harmony with the 
“Environment,” with “Safety” as a basic premise.115 The second principle 
is “building a multilayered and diversified flexible energy supply-and-
demand structure.”116 What these principles amount to in policy terms is 
a complete overhaul of the status quo in Japan’s energy supply system. 
More specifically, the energy reform redefines the roles of fossil fuels, 
nuclear power, and renewable energy in Japan’s domestic energy 
portfolio. While the direction of the domestic energy portfolio is clear, 
there remain policy obstacles in executing such a reactionary and drastic 
change to the well-developed energy portfolio that existed prior to the 
Fukushima NPP disaster. 
There are two main policies that arose out of the Fukushima NPP 
disaster: the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund Act (“Fund 
Act”) and the contagion effects on undamaged energy companies. Five 
months after the Fukushima NPP disaster, the Fund Act was adopted to 
provide expeditious and appropriate compensation for nuclear damage, 
and ensure a stable supply of electricity and the smooth and 
uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors.117 The Fund Act adopted a 
 
 110. See Nuclear Power in Japan, World Nuclear Ass’n, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/ 
Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Japan/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2015). 
 111. See Semmler, supra note 21, at 6–7; see also Hisashi Hattori, Analysis: Japan’s Energy Policy 
Has Been Governed by Series of Shocks, Asahi Shimbun (May 5, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/ 
article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201205050050; Mari Iwata & Henry Hoenig, Japan Struggles to Find 
Balanced Energy Strategy, Wall St. J. (May 13, 2015, 11:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
japan-struggles-to-find-balanced-energy-strategy-1431545581; Justin McCurry, Japan’s New Prime 
Minister Promises Ambitious Greenhouse Gas Cuts, Guardian (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2009/sep/07/japan-greenhouse-gas-cuts. 
 112. Japan generated 1059 terawatt-hours (“TWh”) gross, 338 TWh from coal, 408 TWh from gas 
(up from 300 TWh in 2010), 9 TWh from nuclear (cf 288 TWh in 2010), 161 TWh from oil (up from 94 
TWh in 2010), and 84 TWh from hydro. See Japan: International Energy Data and Analysis, supra note 9.  
 113. See Cabinet Decision on the New Strategic Energy Plan, Agency for Nat. Res. & Energy, 
Ministry of Econ., Trade & Indus. of Japan, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2014/0411_02.html 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Agency for Nat. Res. & Energy, supra note 107, at 18. 
 117. See generally Serita & Xu, supra note 22 (examining Japanese market activity in the period 
after the NPP disaster and passage of the Fund Act). The Fund Act was adopted by the Cabinet on 
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financial assistance scheme to insulate energy companies from 
bankruptcy and dissolution when it is found liable for particular acts so 
egregious that a resulting judgment would cause the energy company to 
become insolvent.118 The Fund Act was particularly enacted to serve the 
owner and operator of the Fukushima NPP, the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (“TEPCO”), in anticipation of its liability for the Fukushima 
NPP disaster.119 Essentially, use of the Act converts commercial electric 
power companies into state-owned enterprises, allowing consumers to 
pay the electricity bill and pay for losses of monopolistic electric power 
companies upon proof of liability.120 For example, when TEPCO was 
found negligent in its maintenance and operation of the Fukushima NPP, 
and therefore liable for the Fukushima NPP disaster, recovery for losses 
to victims from TEPCO would have been enormous. Because TEPCO 
would owe money and penalties in excess of its income stream, TEPCO 
would have been forced into bankruptcy and closure, resulting in loss of 
electrical power, amongst other energy sources, to all consumers in its 
region. In other words, judgment owed by TEPCO would hurt the public 
and therefore be counterintuitive to its purpose. To avoid insolvency and 
any social, political, and economic ramifications that insolvency might 
have created, the Fund Act was triggered and enabled recovery owed by 
TEPCO to be shifted to the Japanese government and ultimately the 
Japanese public at large.121 Therefore, the Fund Act allowed TEPCO to 
continue to operate and victims to be made whole.  
The Fund Act limits energy companies’ liability when the energy 
company operates to effectuate Japan’s climate laws. The Fund Act is 
just one demonstration of how the Japanese government has drastically 
changed its law and policy on climate law. However, it remains unclear 
how the Fund Act will help Japan’s domestic energy portfolio and, in 
turn, whether it will help Japan meet its Kyoto Protocol obligations given 
that absent the Fund Act, undamaged power companies would be 
entitled to keep their respective economic gains. However, under the 
Fund Act terms, these segmented regional monopolistic companies must 
use their profits to assist TEPCO pay its judgment.122 As a result, the 
Fukushima NPP disaster has indeed created detrimental contagion 
effects to undamaged power companies. 
The second policy obstacle with the new domestic energy portfolio 
is concerned with significant economic changes experienced by energy 
 
June 14, 2011, revised and passed by special committee of the House on July 25, 201,1 and passed by 
the Diet on August 3, 2011. Id. at 28. 
 118. See Serita & Xu, supra note 22. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 29. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 28–29. 
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companies that were not damaged or directly affected by the Fukushima 
NPP disaster. The Fukushima NPP disaster adversely affected TEPCO 
directly and contagion effects were felt by non-TEPCO companies that 
did not experience damage, but nevertheless, became subject to sweeping 
energy portfolio and policy changes domestically. Like the United States, 
the Japanese government does not own or operate domestic energy 
production; rather, a collective of ten local power companies control the 
domestic energy market, and these nongovernmental companies rarely 
compete with marginalized fringe firms that dare to emerge.123 
Furthermore, similar to how the energy market operates in the United 
States, these monopolies generate, transmit, and distribute electricity 
exclusively to their segregated regions.124 Therefore, each power 
company has a duty and responsibility to provide energy to any and all 
customers in that area.125 In other words, each power company cannot 
and does not operate beyond its established borders, and therefore 
effects from Fukushima NPP disaster did not directly spread to other 
energy industries or companies due in large part to the fact that 
segmented regional monopolistic companies produce domestic energy. 
Nevertheless, energy companies nationally have transformed Japan’s 
energy portfolio through technology and other economic efforts to create 
a low-carbon, nuclear free society.126 
First, general electric utilities have had to forego traditional means 
of electricity generation and, in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, 
experienced stoppages imposed on them by the government due to no 
culpable behavior or action of their own. Utilities companies taking issue 
with this is valid given that the six-month temporary stoppage in the 
summer of 2012 cost eight of the ten power utilities $8.5 billion because 
they had to buy more oil and gas to replace idle nuclear reactors.127 Such 
 
 123. Id. at 8. 
 124. Id. at 8–9. In the United States, 
the pact that utilities have made in exchange for an exclusive service territory is to provide 
energy to any and all customers in that area. The assumption is that the level of energy 
demand in the territory is irrelevant because the supply the utility provides will be abundant 
and secure. The law compels utilities to abide by energy policy’s overarching objectives—
including to assure abundant power supplies. 
Davies, supra note 5, at 1968.  
 125. See Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 8–9 As courts have repeatedly held,  
[T]he term ‘public utility’ implies a public use, carrying with it the duty to serve the public 
and treat all persons alike, without discrimination, and it precludes the idea of service which 
is private in its nature, whether for the benefit and advantage of a few or of many . . . .  
Id. 
 126. Semmler, supra note 21, at 29; Yoshifumi Nakashima, Launch of a New Climate Change 
Campaign, “Fun to Share”, Japan Env’t Q. (June 2014), http://www.env.go.jp/en/focus/jeq/issue/vol06/
feature.html. 
 127. See Belogolova, supra note 102. 
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costs then passed on to the consumers who experienced an energy bill 
increase of 8.5% despite Japan’s energy costs already being among the 
highest in the world due to the imposed stoppages.128 Moreover, when the 
Japanese government was considering a nuclear phase out, one study 
found that such a take-it-or-leave-it stance would cost consumers $10 
billion (or $115 per household) and businesses $22 billion.129 The fallout 
would have cost some 420,000 on-site jobs, leading to an approximately 
$11 billion annual decline in corporate tax revenue, and thereby 
escalating the already massive debt problem faced by the world’s third 
largest economy.130 Such economic instability is not desired, especially 
amongst the private energy industry that would get the brunt of the 
vicious cycle. According to the chairman of Sumitomo Chemical and 
head of Japan’s largest business lobby, Japanese energy companies 
would have to “start to move overseas” if prolonged energy shortages 
are forecasted, or if national policy effects from the post-Fukushima NPP 
disaster prove to be too detrimental.131 
The sudden and heavy retreat from nuclear power to fossil fuels has 
caused a direct increase in CO2 emissions by 1.4%, in direct opposition to 
Japan’s Kyoto Protocol reduction target.132 Accordingly, in August 2015, 
Prime Minister Abe took a decisive step toward resurrecting the nuclear 
power industry and ending a de facto freeze on the use of nuclear power 
by restarting a reactor at the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant.133 Other 
reactors might restart too.134 Still, questions arise as to whether Japan will 
also comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The Japanese government struggles 
to agree on both a coherent long-term domestic energy portfolio and the 
country’s role in the international energy market. 
2. International Power Production 
Japan lacks minerals and energy domestically, and, as a result of this 
geographic and commodity vulnerability, Japan has a substantial 
international energy portfolio given that it “needs to import about 84% 
of its energy requirements.”135 To illustrate, prior to the Fukushima NPP 
disaster, Japan was the third largest producer of nuclear energy136 and 
imported ninety-three percent of its energy supply.137 To meet its needs, 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Tabuchi, supra note 108. 
 132. Mari Iwata, Japan CO2 Emissions Worst on Record, Wall St. J. (Nov. 17, 2014, 5:50 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2014/11/17/japan-co2-emissions-worst-on-record/. 
 133. Martin, supra note 16. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Nuclear Power in Japan, supra note 110. 
 136. Belogolova, supra note 102. 
 137. Semmler, supra note 21, at 3. 
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Japan structured its international energy dealings so that it receives a 
supply of fossil fuels cheaply from other countries.138 However, in the wake 
of the Fukushima NPP disaster, the Japanese government has adopted an 
energy import model. 
Under an energy import model, utility companies continue to 
import natural gas to generate power while the Japanese government 
develops energy production sources abroad. For example, utility companies 
import eighty percent of Japan’s oil and twenty percent of its natural gas 
from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz.139 Meanwhile, the 
Japanese government has adopted an energy import model akin to South 
Korea, Russia, and France.140 Those countries have successfully contracted 
with emerging and developing countries to build, own, and operate power 
plants for energy export to their respective countries.141 Pertinent here, 
Japan continues to seek contracts with countries such as Malaysia, India, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, and Jordan to develop and export energy for 
consumption in Japan.142 Japan continues to adhere to its energy import 
model despite the scarcity of countries willing to risk international 
sanctions as they increase their CO2 emissions for Japan.
143 
Moreover, the energy import model has aggregated Japan’s trade 
deficit, placing an extra burden on the national economy.144 In fact, 
energy imports accounted for fifty-five percent of Japan’s $169 billion 
trade deficit from 2011 through 2013.145 To alleviate the financial burden, 
Japan created its first domestic carbon tax, the Tax for Climate Change 
Mitigation, which began to be enforced in 2012.146 This carbon tax 
spreads the burden of fossil fuel use widely and thinly in an effort to 
leverage economic incentives through taxation and strengthen energy-
 
 138. Id. at 5. 
 139. See Abe Seeks to Allow SDF Minesweeping in Strait of Hormuz, Citing Economic, Energy 
Risk, Asahi Shimbun (Feb. 17, 2015), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201502170036. 
 140. See Japan’s Nuclear Power Policy at a Crossroads, Asahi Shimbun (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201103162974. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Yuriy Humber & Chikako Mogi, Japan’s Idled Reactors, Weak Yen Drive Deficit on Energy, 
Bloomberg Bus. (Sept. 18, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-18/japan-
s-idled-reactors-weak-yen-drive-deficit-on-energy. 
 145. Id. (“With renewable energy not widespread enough to fill the gap, utilities and other 
companies have had to import natural gas to generate power. From 2011 through 2013, Japan’s trade 
balance worsened by a cumulative 18.1 trillion yen ($169 billion), estimates Taro Saito, director of 
economic research at the NLI Research Institute in Tokyo. Of that amount, 10 trillion yen, or 55%, 
came from energy imports. As a result, Japan’s trade balance has been in the red every month since 
June 2012 . . . . As a result of the high cost of imported fuel, Japan’s current account registered a $3.9 
billion monthly deficit in June. If such deficits persist, downward pressure on the yen could build.”). 
 146. Ministry of the Env’t, Details on the Carbon Tax (Tax for Climate Change Mitigation), 
http://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/tax/env-tax/20121001a_dct.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
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related CO2 emissions control measures.
147 Still, questions arise as to 
whether an energy import model and carbon tax program are long-term 
solutions to help Japan comply with the Kyoto Protocol. 
B. Compliance Goals 
Despite the Fukushima NPP disaster, Japan has remained committed 
to complying with its goal of reducing CO2 emissions to seven percent 
below 1990 levels. To do this, Japan established domestic compliance 
mechanisms, adopted Germany’s post-Fukushima NPP disaster energy 
model, and created a regulatory authority to oversee its domestic nuclear 
power industry. 
1. Domestic Compliance Mechanisms 
In addition to using the carbon trading mechanisms to meet its CO2 
emissions targets, Japan has adopted two domestic market-based 
policies, a cap-and-trade program and a limited feed-in tariff.148 A cap-
and-trade policy is based on quantity.149 Instead of setting a price on each 
unit of pollution, the Ministry of Environment for Japan determines a 
total quantity of pollution (“cap”) allowed per participant.150 Similar to 
the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon trading system, these domestic CO2 
emissions allowances are bought and sold between companies based on 
their needs.151 Moreover, the government has the authority to issue 
penalties (or other appropriate actions) to companies who fail to 
purchase credits when they exceed their allocation.152 The cap-and-trade 
system serves to make renewables cost competitive with fossil fuels and 
reduce CO2 emissions.
153 However, Japan has not implemented a cap-and 
trade-policy nationally.154 For example, Tokyo, Japan’s largest CO2 emitter 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Japan: Carbon Pricing Experience, Partnership for Mkt. Readiness, 
https://www.thepmr.org/country/japan-0 (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); Office of Mkt. Mechanisms, 
Ministry of the Env’t of Japan, Consideration of Emissions Trading Scheme in Japan 3, 5 (Apr. 
2012), https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/ets/mkt_mech/scheme-emissions_trading.pdf; Int’l Emissions 
Trading Ass’n, Japan: The World’s Carbon Markets: A Case Study Guide to Emissions Trading 2 
(Sept. 2013), http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_japan_ 
case_study_september_2013.pdf. 
 149. See James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 87, 122–23 
(2014). 
 150. Id.; Ministry of the Env’t of Japan, Scheme Options for Japanese Emissions Trading Scheme 
Based on Cap and Trade System 3 (Sept. 2010), https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/ets/mkt_mech/scheme- 
options100910.pdf. 
 151. Id. at 10. 
 152. Id. at 8, 21. 
 153. Semmler, supra note 21, at 25. 
 154. Id. at 15–16, n.28 (“Cap-and-trade is a system for the reduction of carbon emissions. A 
governmental body will set a cap on the amount of a pollutant which may be emitted overall. Firms 
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and the world’s most populated metropolis, has its own cap-and-trade 
policy.155 Despite having had “remarkable reductions,” Tokyo’s cap-and-
trade policy remains limited geographically and has not been adopted 
nationally.156 Accordingly, domestic mechanisms to reduce CO2 emissions 
remain limited, and as a result, Japan might not be able to attain its 
Kyoto Protocol obligations. 
Absent a cap-and-trade policy, the Japanese government has 
established a limited feed-in tariff.157 The tariff is limited because the 
policy applies only to “surplus electricity generated through solar PV 
from residential, non-business owners.”158 Moreover, the tariff requires 
electronic power suppliers to procure the whole renewable electricity at a 
fixed price, and each supplier collects surcharges from electricity users to 
cover the costs.159 This domestic mechanism has reduced negative 
externalities from fossil fuels and reduced amounts of fossil fuel and 
uranium imports, allowing the feed-in tariff to “pay for itself within a 
year.”160 The feed-in tariff has been Japan’s most effective policy tool for 
diffusing solar energy.161 As a result, the feed-in tariff is a more popular 
domestic mechanism than a national cap-and-trade policy because the 
tariff option imposes more economic flexibility should Japan not be able 
to comply with the Kyoto Protocol.162 
2. Modeling a New Energy Portfolio After Germany 
A year before the Fukushima NPP disaster, Germany had brokered 
a deal to extend the lives of its seventeen active nuclear power plants by 
twelve years and was expanding its renewable energy market.163 For 
example, Germany was quickly expanding its solar capacity given that its 
solar resources were fourteen percent less than Japan’s solar resources at 
 
permits and gradually reducing them, policy makers have a mechanism of putting a price on the social 
cost of carbon, as well as reducing a country’s emissions.”). 
 155. Tokyo Metropolitan Gov’t, Tokyo Climate Change Strategy: Progress Report and 
Future Vision (Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/attachement/tokyo_climate_ 
change_strategy_progress_report_03312010.pdf; Bureau of the Env’t, Tokyo Metropolitan Gov’t, 
Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program: Japan’s First Mandatory Emissions Trading Scheme (Mar. 2010), 
https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/attachement/Tokyo-cap_and_trade_program-march_2010_TMG.pdf; 
Masahiro Kimura, Tokyo Metropolitan Gov’t-Env’t, Tokyo: Cap and Trade Program: Lessons 
Learned (June 10, 2010), https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/07_tokyo_masahiro_kimura.pdf. 
 156. Kimura, supra note 155, at 2. 
 157. Japan: Carbon Pricing Experience, supra note 148. 
 158. Semmler, supra note 21, at 25. 
 159. Japan: Carbon Pricing Experience, supra note 148. 
 160. Semmler, supra note 21, at 26. 
 161. Id. at 25. 
 162. Id. at 26 (“Mainly driven by former prime minister Naota Kan and Softbank’s CEO 
Masayoshi Son, Japan’s feed-in tariff is to be extended to geothermal, wind, small hydro and biogas in 
mid 2012.”). 
 163. Davies, supra note 5, at 1948. 
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the time.164 Germany promoted itself as an economic and environmental 
leader.165 However, the Fukushima NPP disaster ignited antinuclear 
sentiment in Germany to all-time highs, prompting Germany to 
immediately reverse its nuclear plans.166 To do this, Germany announced 
that it would shut down all seven nuclear power plants constructed prior 
to 1980 with a desire to phase out all reactors by 2017.167 In reality, 
Germany began “phas[ing] out its remaining ten reactors, so that after 
2022 no nuclear power plant would operate in Germany.”168 The revised 
policy raised concerns about additional greenhouse gas emissions; 
however, those concerns were quickly subdued when Germany approved 
licenses for expanding its renewable energy production.169 Now, Germany’s 
renewable, hydro, and nuclear energy comprises twenty percent of its 
energy portfolio, which is nearly triple Japan’s seven percent and double 
China’s nine percent.170 More importantly, Germany has met its energy 
demand, albeit with imported power from France and the Czech 
Republic, both heavy users of nuclear power.171 Additionally, there has 
been a wealth transfer from nuclear energy companies to renewable 
energy companies in Germany.172 Germany’s revised energy model has 
been hailed as an example of how a country can reduce its use of nuclear 
power and its emissions of greenhouse gases at the same time.173 
Given that success, Japan aims to mirror the energy model 
developed by Germany to make its renewable energy twenty percent to 
twenty-two percent of its energy portfolio by 2030.174 In 2011, then-Prime 
Minister Yoshihiko Noda emphasized to the business community that 
renewable, not nuclear, power was the future when he pledged to reduce 
Japan’s reliance on nuclear power over time by closing all fifty of the 
 
 164. Semmler, supra note 21, at 16. 
 165. Davies, supra note 5, at 1948. 
 166. Id. at 1938–49. 
 167. Young-Doo Wang et al., supra note 99.  
 168. Davies, supra note 5, at 1949.  
The German decision was met with great domestic fanfare. Whereas a poll showed fifty-six 
percent of Germans opposing the extension of nuclear plants’ lives in 2010, the phaseout-by-
2022 proposal rushed through the German legislature: eighty-five percent of parliamentarians 
supported the move, and the vote in the lower house was an overwhelming 513–79.  
Id. at 1950. 
 169. Young-Doo Wang et al., supra note 99, at 12–13; Davies, supra note 5, at 1963. 
 170. Semmler, supra note 21, at 8. 
 171. Davies, supra note 5, at 1951. 
 172. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 2–3. 
 173. Malcolm Foster, Japan’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Efforts Eroded by Fukushima Nuclear 
Disaster, Huffington Post Green (July 4, 2012, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/04/
japan-greenhouse-gas-emissions_n_1476580.html. 
 174. The Kyushu Electric Power Company restarted its Sendai 1 reactor on August 11, 2015 and its 
Sendai 2 reactor on October 15, 2015. Japan Nuclear Update, Nuclear Energy Inst., 
http://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/Japan-Nuclear-Update (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
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country’s functioning reactors by around 2040.175 However, unlike 
Germany, Japan cannot buy electricity from neighboring countries 
during periods of shortfalls or blackouts because Japan does not share 
power grids with any other country.176 Therefore, Japan’s use of Germany’s 
energy model is limited and might not attain the same success. 
3. Creation of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority 
To comply with the Kyoto Protocol, Japan’s Ministry of the 
Environment and the Ministry of the Economy, Trade, and Industry 
created the Nuclear Regulation Authority (“NRA”) in September 
2012.177 The NRA is an “external organization of the Ministry of the 
Environment” responsible for overseeing the domestic nuclear power 
industry.178 This new agency replaced a patchwork of bureaucrats who 
controlled the industry before the Fukushima NPP disaster and who 
were moving glacially to restart the idled reactors.179 So far, the NRA has 
only deemed one of forty-eight reactors ready, though forty-three 
reactors are operable and potentially able to restart.180 Twenty-four of 
these reactors are in the process of restart approvals.181 Additionally, the 
NRA has established new post-Fukushima NPP disaster technical 
standards for nuclear reactors.182 For example, the NRA has required 
upgrades of the remaining reactors to new industry standards even 
though it might cost more than $12 billion, a sum the utilities companies 
have already pledged.183 
III.  Proposal 
In leading to the shutdown of all nuclear power plants from 2011 to 
2013, the Fukushima NPP disaster has exacerbated and created a new 
barrier to compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Compared to other energy 
sources, nuclear energy produces up to thirty-six percent less CO2 
emissions.184 In fact, nuclear power is capable of producing huge amounts of 
 
 175. Id.; Justin McCurry, Japan’s New Prime Minister Promises Ambitious Greenhouse Gas Cuts, 
Guardian (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/sep/07/japan-greenhouse- 
gas-cuts. 
 176. Foster, supra note 173. 
 177. Nuclear Regulation Auth., Japan, Nuclear Regulation for People and the 
Environment 3, https://www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/nsr_leaflet_English.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Humber & Mogi, supra note 144, at 1. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Japan Nuclear Update, supra note 174. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Nuclear power emits 73 million tonnes of CO2 to generate 2518 TWh of electricity. To 
generate the same amount of electricity, natural gas would emit 1256 CO2, oil would emit 1846 CO2, 
coal would emit 2236 CO2, and lignite would emit 2654 CO2. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Avoided 
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energy with little or no carbon emissions.185 This is because the processes 
of running a nuclear power plant generate no CO2, but some CO2 
emissions arise from the construction of the plant, the mining of the 
uranium, the enrichment of the uranium, its conversion into nuclear fuel, 
its final disposal, and the final plant decommissioning.186 For that reason, 
nuclear power is the best option to effectuate and comply with Japan’s 
Kyoto Protocol reduced CO2 emissions target. 
If Japan reverts its plan to be antinuclear, Japan will have a much 
tougher time reducing emissions and meeting its reduced CO2 emissions 
target. According to one study, “[w]ithout nuclear power, Japan is 
projected to produce an additional 180 million [to] 210 million tons of 
emissions” in one fiscal year as “compared to the base year of 1990, when 
emissions totaled 1.261 billion tons.”187 This study is proof that a nuclear 
phase out would aggravate Japan’s international energy portfolio by 
placing a greater importance on the import of fuel.188 Moreover, Japan’s 
domestic energy portfolio will be compromised. 
With virtually no alternate source of energy that is as plentiful and 
cheap as nuclear power, Japan is economically, historically, and 
culturally handcuffed to nuclear power.189 Former industry minister and 
current economic and fiscal policy minister Kaoru Yosano has stated that 
the “use of nuclear power [is] unavoidable to support the country’s 
economy and its people’s livelihoods.”190 In light of this dependence, 
Japan continues to spend sixty-four percent of its 500 billion yen energy 
research and development budget on nuclear energy.191 Moreover, the 
government provides huge subsidies to power companies in the nuclear 
industry.192 In other words, the Japanese government has assumed the 
 
Through Use of Nuclear Energy, World Nuclear Ass’n, http://www.world-nuclear.org/Nuclear-
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 187. Foster, supra note 173. 
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 191. Belogolova, supra note 102; see also Hideyuki Ban, Cost of Nuclear Power in Japan, Citizens 
Nuclear Info. Ctr., http://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit113/nit113articles/nit113cost.html (last 
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cost of power plant risks and will not allow energy companies to become 
insolvent.193 As a result, Japan has institutionalized corporate power 
plant initiatives ahead of government policy in an effort to privatize 
industry profits and socialize industry losses, and any reversal of this 
relationship would upset domestic energy policies.194 
While one nuclear power plant has restarted in August 2015, 
whether and when all nuclear power plants will come back online, and 
what that implies for Japan’s long-term emissions trajectory is still to be 
determined.195 Japan should be allowed to continue using CO2 emitting 
power (and to withdraw from the Protocol) because it cannot turn to rely 
on nuclear power in light of shutdowns and political pushes toward 
nuclear reduction. 
A. Japan Will Fail to Comply with the Kyoto Protocol 
Japan has not and cannot reduce its CO2 emissions to 6% below its 
1990 level as a result of energy portfolio changes that occurred due to the 
Fukushima NPP disaster. A couple of years before the Fukushima NPP 
disaster, the Japanese government proclaimed it was “on target to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions by an estimated average of 8% below 1990 
levels, . . . meaning it [would] meet its commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol.”196 At the same time, some reports expressed doubt when they 
clarified that Japan could “still barely meet its commitment under the 
Kyoto Protocol to reduce emissions during the five-year period through 
2012 by an average of [6%] from 1990 levels.”197 For the reasons stated 
earlier, the Fukushima NPP disaster thwarted all projections and realities 
for Japan to meet its reduced CO2 emissions targets. More recently, the 
Japanese government has admitted that it will produce, instead of 
reduce, more CO2 emissions than it did in 1990.
198 
According to the Japanese government’s calculations, Japan will 
produce 15% to 16% more CO2 emissions in 2020 than it did in 1990, 
reflecting a rise in non-nuclear power after the progressive and indefinite 
closure of all nuclear plants.199 So far, Japan is on track to meet this 
horrifying projection. In 2013, Japan’s CO2 emissions rose 10.8% above 
its 1990 levels, making 2013 Japan’s second highest emissions of CO2 on 
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record.200 Moreover, “[p]reliminary data in December had shown the 
emissions were a record high in . . . 2014.”201Accordingly, with a definitive 
plan to bring nuclear power back into Japan’s domestic energy portfolio, 
Japan has and will continue to leave a lasting carbon footprint in the 
wake of the Fukushima NPP disaster, and therefore fail to meet its 
reduced CO2 emissions target. 
B. Japan Should Be Excused from Kyoto Protocol Obligations 
This Note argues that the Fukushima NPP disaster was an event of 
force majeure. Force majeure is a legal principle, provided for either by 
contract or imposed on parties by law or the courts. As stated earlier, this 
principle excuses, or partially excuses, one or both parties to a contract 
from performing contractual obligations in certain specified circumstances.202 
Rather than excuse a party that could have avoided its failure to perform 
through commercially reasonable means, force majeure excuses a party 
from performance obligations or liability if some unforeseen event beyond 
the control of that party prevents it from performing its contractual 
obligations.203 Aligned with this latter definition, the Kyoto Protocol 
states that a “Force Majeure Event” means “any event beyond the 
reasonable control of the person affected including, without limitation, 
labor dispute, act of God, war, act or circumstance of terrorism, riot, civil 
commotion, malicious damage, accident, breakdown of essential computer 
software, hardware or system failure, fire, flood and/or storm and other 
unforeseen circumstances materially and adversely affecting the 
performance” of the country.204 When a force majeure event causes 
noncompliance, “for so long as the circumstances continue, [the country] 
shall be relieved of its obligations under the Terms and Conditions which 
it has been prevented from fulfilling as a result of that Force Majeure 
Event without liability.”205 Of course, the obliged country must still “take 
all reasonable and practical steps to minimize any loss and/or disruption 
resulting from any such Force Majeure Event.”206 The impact of an “act 
of God” depends on the size and composition of the affected party, and 
can lead to complete noncompliance, thereby excusing a party from its 
obligations.207 
 
 200. Osamu Tsukimori, Japan Sets 26 Percent Cut in Greenhouse Gas Emissions as Target, Reuters 
(July 17, 2015, 12:19 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/17/us-japan-carbon-idUSKCN0 
PR0A220150717. 
 201. Osamu Tsukimori, Japan’s CO2 Emissions Hit Second-Highest on Record, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/14/us-carbon-japan-idUSKBN0N50BJ20150414. 
 202. Force Majeure Clause, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 203. See id. 
 204. UNFCCC Lima Report, supra note 61, at 6. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
J - Durr_15 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:43 PM 
526 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:499 
Here, force majeure could be applied to excuse Japan, a party to the 
Kyoto Protocol ratified in 2002, from its CO2 emissions reduction 
requirements in light of the Fukushima NPP disaster. Specifically, this 
Note argues that the earthquake and tsunami were “acts of God,” as 
contemplated by force majeure; that those “acts of God” led to the 
destruction of the Fukushima NPP and the dismantling of nuclear power 
in Japan; that these events were unforeseen and beyond the control of 
Japan; and that the events will prevent Japan from performing its Kyoto 
Protocol obligations.208 
C. Japan Can Successfully Argue Force Majeure 
In order to evoke force majeure, a party must be excused by the 
supervising party when four factors have been met: (1) adequate notice 
of the event has been given; (2) performance is not otherwise possible; 
(3) the duration of time of the force majeure events renders performance 
impossible or insurmountable such that one or both of the contracting 
parties might find performance unsatisfactory and prefer some alternative 
arrangement; and (4) allocation of performance is not fair and not 
reasonable.209 
Here, adequate notice has, arguably, sufficiently been given. 
Because the Fukushima NPP disaster occurred just one year prior to the 
Kyoto Protocol target deadline and the Fukushima NPP disaster was 
well-publicized throughout the world, then the UNFCCC was given 
sufficient notice of the Fukushima NPP. In the alternative, Japan can and 
should now evoke force majeure to the UNFCCC so as to give explicit 
notice of the economic, environmental, and political consequences the 
Fukushima NPP disaster created that has and will continue to cause 
Japan to not comply with its Kyoto Protocol obligations. Although it may 
be argued that Japan is exploiting the Fukushima NPP disaster to avoid 
unattainable Kyoto Protocol obligation, Japan would have legal grounds 
to claim force majeure. 
Second, performance is not otherwise possible for Japan. Currently, 
all but one of the forty-eight reactors have been shut down since the 
Fukushima NPP disasterforty-three reactors are operable and 
potentially able to restart, and twenty-four of these are in the process of 
restart approvals.210 While Prime Minister Abe champions for nuclear 
power plants, various district courts in Japan have blocked his efforts by 
upholding an injunction banning the restart of local nuclear reactors. 
Such was the case in Fukui where the court “dismissed” a “motion for a 
stay on an earlier decision to temporarily bar the restart of the No. 3 and 
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No. 4 reactors at plant in Takahama.”211 The court reasoned that nuclear 
power plants were not safe to reopen at that time.212 Nuclear power 
plants might be safe to reopen once the government has fully developed 
an energy portfolio with sufficient safeguards. To date, the 2014 Strategic 
Energy Plan addresses such concerns, but lacks public support.213 
Moreover, Japan lacks minerals and energy domestically to serve as 
alternatives. As a result of this geographic and commodity vulnerability, 
Japan is dependent on its substantial international energy portfolio that 
“imports about 84% of its energy requirements” absent its ability to 
produce nuclear energy domestically.214 Simply put, performance is not 
otherwise possible for Japan. 
Third, there is great uncertainty and disagreement within the 
Japanese government as to how long the period of nuclear power plant 
suspension should and will be. Given the previously discussed barriers to 
compliance, the delay in performance resulting from the Fukushima NPP 
disaster and subsequent nuclear power shut downs has proven to be 
quite lengthy and indefinite. Accordingly, the short- and long-term 
consequences are still being realized. Therefore, such a drawn out force 
majeure event should render Japan’s performance impossible or 
insurmountable, and thus Japan should be excused under force majeure. 
In accordance with the enforcement branch’s compliance mechanism, 
Japan might be able to cover its deficit in the second commitment period 
ending in 2020.215 However, Japan might not be able to fully comply with 
that mechanism because it also requires Japan to reduce its CO2 
emissions another 30% of that deficit, in addition to whatever its 
commitment would be for that period.216 In total, Japan would have to 
reduce its CO2 emissions to 32.8% below 1990 levels by 2020.
217 Such an 
allocation of performance is not fair and reasonable because Japan might 
be unable to fairly and reasonably allocate its carbon credits to meet its 
Kyoto Protocol targets by 2020. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Japan can 
use three mechanisms that allow it and private companies to buy, 
generate, or trade emissions credits. These credits then count toward 
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Japan’s reduction target. While normally this option would be exercised, 
Japan was close to meeting its target in 2010 until the Fukushima NPP 
disaster occurred just one year prior to the Kyoto target deadline. 
Accordingly, Japan’s government appropriately focused its energy 
toward the safety of its people and on addressing the issues that had led 
to the Fukushima NPP disaster, rather than the consequences of missing 
its Kyoto targets. Therefore, it would not have been fair or reasonable 
for the Japanese government to spend time, energy, and resources on 
obtaining emissions credits under the various mechanisms. Moreover, it 
is neither industry custom nor the practice of the government to put 
environmental issues before human lives and reacting to a nuclear power 
plant disaster. Accordingly, the Fukushima NPP disaster was a legitimate 
reason for Japan to allocate its efforts away from meeting its Kyoto 
targets. Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol is not and cannot be a 
priority of the Japanese government following the Fukushima NPP 
disaster. 
One inevitable consequence of the Fukushima NPP disaster not 
being a priority of the Japanese government is that it will not comply 
with the Kyoto Protocol. Japan has focused on diversifying its energy 
portfolio to safely meet current power needs rather than addressing its 
Kyoto targets. While this might seem like an act of intentional 
noncompliance, this Note argues that such an act is of inadvertence. No 
behavior of Japan contributed to the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear 
power plant destruction that simultaneously occurred. In fact, but for the 
Fukushima NPP disaster, the Japanese government and TEPCO would 
have honored various supply agreements, purchase orders, joint venture 
agreements, and many other contractual relationships it had with 
consumers, suppliers, and employees. Now, Japan is simply not able to 
do so. By evoking force majeure to free itself from Kyoto Protocol 
obligations, Japan might also free itself from like treaties and agreements 
that imposed similar obligations that it is no longer able to comply with 
due to the Fukushima NPP disaster. In doing so, Japan could avoid any 
and all penalties for noncompliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Such a 
decision is valid under Article 27(2) of the Kyoto Protocol, which permits 
countries to withdraw within “one year from the date of . . . notification 
of withdrawal.”218 
 
 218. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 27; see also Status of Ratification of Kyoto Protocol, 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ 
background/items/6603.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
J - Durr_15 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:43 PM 
February 2016]            BEYOND CONTROL AND WITHOUT FAULT 529 
Conclusion 
Japan’s carbon emissions reduction targets established by the Kyoto 
Protocol have been frustrated by the unanticipated events of the 
Fukushima NPP disaster. As no country has ever experienced an 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster collectively on one 
single day,219 the events constitute unforeseen “acts of God” of a magnitude 
sufficient to excuse Japan from its contractual obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Therefore, because these were force majeure events, Japan 
should not be penalized for failing to meet its Kyoto Protocol carbon 
emissions reduction targets or from withdrawing from the agreement as 
it continues to restructure its energy portfolio to meet its people’s needs 
in the wake of the Fukushima NPP disaster. 
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